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Abstract 
This short paper aims to increase understanding of tobacco companies‟ advertising 
strategies.  Time series data and intervention analysis methods are used to investigate 
whether tougher tobacco advertising legislation, and the threat of such legislation, 
result in firms significantly changing their advertising activities in the period 
preceding the enactment of legislation.  The paper considers legislation introduced by 
both the UK Government and the EC in recent years.  Results suggest that there is 
some significant short-term increase in advertising behaviour, coinciding with product 
launches that firms instigate prior to legislation changes.  However, firms do not 
generally maintain higher advertising expenditures than previously throughout the 




Many factors have been identified as potentially affecting demand for tobacco and 
cigarettes, including price, income, taxes, anti-smoking campaigns, advertising and 
advertising bans.  Stewart (1993), Bardsley and Olekalns (1999), Saffer and 
Chaloupka (2000), Gallet (2003), and Nelson (2003) provide recent contributions to 
this literature.  This paper instead focuses attention on the factors determining tobacco 
companies‟ advertising strategies, as despite the extensive literature on the effect of 
advertising on tobacco consumption, there remain relatively few studies that discuss 
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the factors determining these strategies.  Bird (2002) estimates the relationship 
between tobacco companies‟ advertising expenditure and market share, whilst Hu et 
al. (1995) present an analysis of the tobacco industry advertising response to 
Californian state legislative changes.  However, their analysis suffers as they were 
unable to obtain data on advertising expenditure.  Meanwhile, Anderson et al. (2002) 
provide an overview of tobacco companies‟ broad marketing activities, whilst 
Chaloupka et al. (2002) focus on price related marketing strategies, and Depkin II 
(1999) examines the impact of advertising restrictions on cigarette prices. 
 
This short paper contributes to the literature by summarising results of a research 
project investigating the implications of tougher tobacco advertising restrictions on 
tobacco companies‟ advertising strategies.  Specifically, does tougher legislation and 
the threat of such legislation result in firms significantly changing their advertising 
activities in the period preceding the enactment of the legislation?  In recent years 
there has been greater interest in the impact of threats on firms‟ behaviour.  In the 
theory of contestable markets the threat of entry into a market by a potential rival 
forces incumbent firms to produce efficiently and to price their goods competitively.  
Further, in the absence of competitive pressures theoretical research, including papers 
by Klevorick (1973), Bawa and Sibley (1980), Logan et al. (1980) and Glazer and 
McMillan (1992), has shown that firms may maintain prices lower than otherwise be 
expected if the firms are concerned about the threat of price regulation or rate-of-
return regulation.  Empirical studies have also concluded that the threat of price 
regulation has a negative impact on firms‟ prices in a variety of industries, see for 
example Taylor and Zona (1997), Zweifel and Crivelli (1996), Acutt  et al. (2001).  
Hence, this paper also extends the literature on regulation and regulatory threats by 
investigating the impact on firms‟ strategies of threatened advertising legislation as 
opposed to price regulation.  The analysis is of particular interest as the paper 
investigates whether the threat of advertising legislation may induce a short-run 
increase in tobacco advertising, i.e. behaviour undesired by governments, whilst the 
threat of price regulation has been found both theoretically and empirically to induce 
lower prices, behaviour desired by the relevant regulator. 
 
This research is timely as the UK Government‟s 2002 Tobacco Advertising and 
Promotion Act and the European Commission‟s 2001 Directive on Tobacco 
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Advertising and Sponsorship both represent measures to restrict further the 
advertising of tobacco products.  These follow earlier unsuccessful efforts by the UK 
Government and the European Commission (EC) to limit tobacco advertising in the 
late 1990s.  An attempt by the EC to introduce tougher tobacco advertising 
restrictions (EC Directive 98/43/EC) was rejected by the European Court of Justice in 
2000.   Meanwhile, the UK Government published regulations in June 1999 that it 
intended to enforce from December 1999 in line with the EC Directive.  However, the 
implementation of these regulations was postponed pending the European Court of 
Justice‟s decision regarding Directive 98/43/EC.  Nevertheless, it should be borne in 
mind that in the UK at least, for a number of years the Tobacco Manufacturers 
Association (TMA) has negotiated a voluntary agreement with the Government, 
limiting firms‟ advertising expenditures, and adhering to rules, for example, regarding 
the size of printed tobacco advertising, and advertising near schools. 
 
The analysis aims to test statistically whether tobacco firms do increase advertising 
prior to an advertising ban being implemented, as there is some documentation from 
the industry suggesting this is true.  For example, Gallaher is reported by Tylee (2003) 
to have spent £2.5 million advertising the launch of a new brand of cigarette in the 
last few days before the main provisions of the 2002 Tobacco Advertising and 
Promotion Act came into force on February 14
th, 2003.  Similarly, Imperial Tobacco‟s 
Lambert and Butler brand had a large advertising campaign at this time, notifying 
consumers about the forthcoming advertising ban, Kleinman (2003).  Results suggest 
that there is some significant short-term increase in advertising behaviour, coinciding 
with product launches that firms instigate prior to legislation changes.  However, 
firms do not generally maintain higher advertising expenditures than previously 
throughout the period between legislation being introduced and coming into force. 
 
2. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
Nominal monthly tobacco advertising data (1993-2003) were supplied by Neilsen 
Media Research.  These industry level data represent UK cigarette, cigar and tobacco 
advertising expenditure, plus corporate tobacco advertising expenditure, i.e. non-
brand specific advertising by tobacco companies, but not sponsorship expenditure.  It 
should be noted that some of this expenditure is not prohibited under the 2002 UK 
Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Bill, which relates specifically to the advertising 
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of tobacco products rather than advertising the firms who produce cigarettes, cigars 
and tobacco under various brand names.  Advertising data were converted into real 




From casual observation of monthly real UK tobacco advertising data in Figure 1, it 
appears that there was a dramatic increase in advertising expenditure in the fourth 
quarter of 1999 prior to the European Court of Justice‟s 2000 rejection of the EC 
tobacco advertising directive.  Then, whilst advertising levels were typically lower 
than previously after 2000, there was a short period of relatively high advertising 















































































Source: Neilsen Media Research 
 
A more rigorous method of testing the impact of legislation and future expected 
legislation on firms‟ advertising strategies is to use time-series intervention analysis.  
This technique allows for a formal test of a change in the mean of a time series.  We 
use the procedure outlined in Enders (2004).  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron unit-root tests confirmed that the data were stationary, whilst 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) modelling indicated that the 
data followed an autoregressive process with just the first and fourth lags being 
significant, with no significant moving average component.
2
  We deliberately 
restricted the number of explanatory variables to the intervention dummies and the 
relevant lagged dependent variables as we were interested in the impact of specific 




 Please contact the corresponding author for full details of results. 
 5 
public policy changes on tobacco advertising levels.  The research project is not an 
attempt to model the multiple factors that influence tobacco advertising strategies.  
Hence, the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, possibly to control for the 
impact of the strength of the economy on advertising levels, seemed unnecessary.  
Extra explanatory variables would have reduced the number of degrees of freedom in 
the statistical analysis, and whilst their inclusion may be expected to increase the 





A number of intervention dummy variables were considered, with Table 1 below 
providing summary information on these variables. 
 
Table 1: Intervention Dummy Variables 
Dummy Variable Dates with dummy = 1 
D1 3/2003 – 12/2003 
D2 2/2003 
D3 4/2002 – 2/2003 
D4 6/2002 – 2/2003 
D5 7/1999 – 12/1999 
D6 10/1999 
D7 8/1998 – 10/2000 
 
Variable D1 was required as inspection of Figure 1 indicated that, as expected, 
tobacco advertising levels fell to almost zero after the 2002 Tobacco Advertising and 
Promotion Act came into force.  D2 was introduced to test if advertising expenditures 
changed significantly in the first two weeks of February 2003 before the 2002 Act 
became operational, whilst D3 and D4 were used to test if tobacco advertising 
increased in the period between the legislation being approved and becoming 
effective.  D4 allows time for the firms to react and alter their advertising strategies 
after the legislation had been approved.  D5 corresponds to the period in 1999 
between when the UK Government announced regulations in line with EC Directive 
98/43/EC and the intended imposition of the regulations.  Dummy variable D7 relates 
                                                 
3
 It should also be noted that because of measurement difficulties, only quarterly data and not monthly 
data for potential control variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are produced. 
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to the period between the EC proposing Directive 98/43/EC and European Court of 
Justice rejecting it, whilst, as to be discussed below, D6 relates to the month in which 
Imperial Tobacco launched its Richmond brand, increasing advertising to support the 
launch. 
 
3. Intervention Analysis of Advertising and Product Launch Strategies 
Analysis focused on the full dataset of 132 observations, for tobacco advertising as a 
whole.  Initially, time-series regressions were used to test whether tobacco advertising 
expenditure changed (increased) significantly in the periods between UK and EC 
legislation being introduced, and either being rejected by the European Court of 
Justice, or becoming effective in the case of the UK 2002 legislation. 
 
Interestingly, the results in Table 2 suggest that whilst, as expected, the coefficient on 
dummy variable D1 is negative at all reasonable significance levels, indicating that 
tobacco advertising fell significantly after the 2002 Act came into force, the 
coefficients on the dummy variables D3 and D7, or D4 and D7 are never significant.  
Similarly, in comparable regressions with intervention dummy variable D7 replaced 
by D5, the coefficient on D5 is not significant.
4
  These results indicate that the 
tobacco industry as a whole did not significantly increase advertising in the face of 
expected future tightened advertising restrictions, irrespective of whether the 
regulations were introduced by the UK Government or the EC.  Yet this may have 
been the rational strategy to adopt given existing evidence regarding the impact of 
advertising on tobacco consumption that indicates that advertising only has a limited 
impact on demand, for example Gallet (2003) and Duffy (1995). 
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Table 2 The Impact of Expected Legislation 
Variable Coefficient p–value  Coefficient p-value  
constant 601700.5 0.001  597768.5 0.001  
real advertising (1) 0.442 0.000  0.442 0.000  
real advertising (4) 0.116 0.204  0.117 0.202  
D1 -663919.1 0.000  -660623.8 0.000  
D3 -50257.6 0.766     
D4    -40830.5 0.842  
D7 68025.0 0.626  69568.5 0.618  
2R  0.436   0.436   
2R  0.413   0.413   
LM (4) 4.049 0.399  3.743 0.442  
F 18.862 0.000  18.848 0.000  
N 128   128   
Note that the number of lags is given in parentheses in column 1.   
LM denotes the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic for serially correlated residual terms. 
N denotes the number of observations used. 
The p-values associated with the coefficient estimates all reflect White‟s 
heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors as diagnostic testing indicated that the OLS 
residuals were characterised by heteroscedasticity. 
 
Analysis continued in an attempt to model and understand the peaks in advertising 
expenditure that occurred in Autumn 1999 and February 2003, with results reported in 
Table 3.   
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Table 3 Advertising and Product Launches 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
constant 608979.4 0.001 
Real advertising (1) 0.442 0.000 
Real advertising (4) 0.101 0.222 
D1 -664045.0 0.000 
D2 739341.9 0.000 
D6 2234431.0 0.000 
2R  0.526  
2R  0.507  
LM 1.123 0.891 
F 27.070 0.000 
N 128  
Note that the p-values associated with the coefficient estimates again all reflect 
White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors as diagnostic testing indicated that 
the OLS residuals were characterised by heteroscedasticity. 
 
The intervention dummies D2 and D6 are each positive and significant at all 
reasonable significance levels indicating significant increases in advertising 
expenditure in February 2003 and October 1999.  The results in Table 2 indicated that 
advertising expenditures did not respond to the threat of a European tightening of 
tobacco advertising legislation in the full period up to the European Court of Justice‟s 
rejection of the legislation in 2000, and that similarly UK tobacco advertising 
expenditure did not increase significantly during the period between the UK Tobacco 
Advertising and Promotion Bill being passed and coming into force.  Nevertheless, 
the coefficients on the intervention variables D2 and D6 indicate that UK tobacco 
advertising increased significantly in two particular months.   
 
The increase in advertising in October 1999 reflects the introduction and roll out of 
the Richmond brand by Imperial Tobacco in September 1999, and Project Dolphin 
documentation indicates that the brand launch was brought forward so that brand 
advertising could be carried out prior to the planned ban on UK advertising in 
December 1999. 
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“In an ideal scenario, we would probably have launched Richmond in January 
or February 2000.  However, as you are aware, the Government plans to ban 
all advertising and promotions by 10
th
 December 1999.  Consequently, we 
have rushed the launch forward to 1
st
 September 1999.” 
      http://www.tobaccopapers.com 
Similarly, Tylee (2003) reported that: 
“Gallaher is blitzing £2.5 million in nine days on a campaign to launch a new 
cigarette in what will be the last Benson and Hedges ad to be seen in Britain.  
The campaign, for Benson & Hedges Silver, is being rushed out in advance of 
the tobacco ad ban beginning on 14 February, meaning that ads will appear 
before the product is available.” 
Hence, whilst tobacco industry advertising as a whole does not appear to be affected 
by the threat of future advertising legislation, individual firms‟ product launch and 
associated advertising strategies do seem to have been affected. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
At first sight, the results above may seem surprising.  In the face of future additional 
tobacco advertising restrictions, firms may have been expected to increase advertising 
in the period prior to tougher legislation becoming effective.  However, in light of the 
existing literature, some of which suggests that the impact of tobacco advertising on 
consumer demand may be minimal, the general strategy adopted of not increasing 
advertising expenditure significantly may be rational.  Firms do not seem to have been 
panicked into increasing their advertising expenditures prior to tougher advertising 
bans being imposed.  Nevertheless, if when faced with greater advertising restrictions, 
firms are already considering the introduction of a new brand, the evidence above 
indicates that these firms brought forward product launches so that extensive 
advertising could be undertaken prior to advertising bans coming into force. Again, 
this may be a sensible strategy to adopt if new products enjoy relatively high 
advertising elasticities of demand in comparison to mature products.  The advertising 
of new products can then be expected to result in market share shifts in favour of the 
new products. This strategy could be interpreted as reflecting tobacco companies‟ 
claims that they use advertising to compete against rivals rather than to increase 
demand for tobacco/cigarettes as a whole.   
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Although we conclude that the advertising strategies adopted by the tobacco 
companies in the face of tougher future advertising restrictions seem sensible, the 
public policy implications of the above results also need to be considered.  If 
governments seek to ban or minimise tobacco advertising then the length of time 
between the announcement of legislation and the date when any legislation passed 
becomes effective should also be minimised.  Although our results suggest that the 
tobacco industry as a whole may not significantly increase advertising expenditures 
prior to additional advertising restrictions being imposed, significant additional 
advertising of new products has been identified.  Alternatively, governments may 
wish to consider restricting the number of new products entering the cigarette market 
in the period between legislation being introduced and coming into force.  However, 
this may be difficult to achieve, and raises issues regarding the extent to which 
governments should restrict firms‟ strategies.  Governments must also consider the 
breadth of advertising restrictions in the face of suggestions that tobacco firms 
continue to promote products in the face of advertising bans. “BWM‟s advertising 
brief for Imperial was for „below the line‟ marketing activity, including point of sale 
material, packaging, events management, and relationship marketing.”, Harper 
(2001).   
 
This research presents an attempt to increase understanding of tobacco companies‟ 
advertising strategies.  It is intended that future research will develop this analysis 
through the use of firm level data.  This will provide not only the ability to compare 
competing firms‟ advertising strategies in the face of tobacco advertising legislation, 
but will also permit the use of panel data regression techniques on a much larger 
dataset.  Research is also still required to understand tobacco firms‟ international 
marketing strategies in the face of tougher advertising legislation in the UK, the EC 
and as an increasing number of countries sign up to the 2003 World Health 
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